Monday, May 26, 2008
And the Spice
Cooling Clothes: "What life should you do in the future of Global warming, and I think that the fashion that acquires the consumer electronic affords the enjoyment and the spice."
Tuesday, May 06, 2008
Rafael Lozano-Hemme
Rafael Lozano-Hemmer's projects are generally pretty amazing. Here is a presentation he gave last year.
Sunday, April 06, 2008
Saturday, April 05, 2008
The Building Constitution
The latest post in Jack Balkin's posts on living constitutionalism expresses many thoughts I have had regarding the purpose and the role of constitutional interpretation. It contrasts the view that (1) the constitution provides a framework (in some places specific, some places vague, and some places silent) that political institutions fill out over time and modify as the knowledge and sensibilities grow and change with the view that the constitution is a integrated document with (2) all meaning and application is bound by the expected application in the late 1700's.
Not explicitly included in the constitution were instructions on how the judiciary and others should interpret and apply the founding document. To determine how the document should be interpreted, any good originalist or textualist should agree that the we should look to the works of the Constitution itself and the practices at the time for clues as to how it should be implemented. Balkin makes the persuasive point that in many places the Constitution is written with broad language, particularly section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Not explicitly included in the constitution were instructions on how the judiciary and others should interpret and apply the founding document. To determine how the document should be interpreted, any good originalist or textualist should agree that the we should look to the works of the Constitution itself and the practices at the time for clues as to how it should be implemented. Balkin makes the persuasive point that in many places the Constitution is written with broad language, particularly section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Thursday, March 06, 2008
Same Sex Marriage
So, the Cal. Supreme Court heard oral argument in In Re Marriage Cases a couple days ago. I listened to some of it here. I didn't think the lawyers on either side were making the best arguments they could. I found it particularly odd that the lawyer for San Francisco didn't think the State of California could not simply create an equal system through eliminating the word "marriage" and call all State sanctioned unions "civil unions" and leave the word "marriage" to individuals and their religions.
There was a good deal of discussion of whether limiting marriage to male-female couples is discrimination based on sex or discrimination based on sexual-orientation, and if the latter, should rational-basis or a heightened level of scrutiny be applied. The court of appeal below decided that the law is not sex discrimination and rational basis review applies. I have previously argued that the restriction is facially discriminatory based on sex (not just sexual orientation), and the court of appeal was able to overlook this fact because of the reflexive nature of the limit
The court of appeal adopted the argument that all people have the same limitation: they cannot marry a person of the opposite sex; therefore, no sex discrimination. However, a more careful analysis is reveals two different rules: (1) men may not marry men; and (2) women may not marry women. Each of these rules is specific to gender and each is sex discrimination. Only men are prevented from marring men, and only women are prevented from marrying women. Clearly men and women are being treated differently, despite the reciprocal nature of the discrimination. It is often argued that limiting marriage only affects individuals who are homosexual. Therefore, it is only sexual-orientation discrimination. This argument is not entirely convincing. Consider a pair of laws that disallows men from working as teachers and women from working as reporters. Clearly the law discriminates on the basis of sex, even though only a narrow portion of the male and female population desire to be teachers and reports, respectively. The laws really only affect sub-categories of "didactically-orientated males" and "inquisitive-orientated females." Similarly marriage limiting laws create two rules, one imposed on all men and one on all women that have their most significant affects on sub-populations of those who desire to be with people of the opposite sex. In either case, the discrimination is still based upon sex.
Here is another idea. Perhaps much of the confusion over the marriage question comes from the many different asserted justifications for the legal status. I identify the following purposes: (1) raising children (through providing a sense of unity, commitment for long term obligations, tax breaks, shared income and responsibilities, etc.), (2) romantic companionship, (3) platonic companionship, (5) mutual support obligations, (6) unification of family assets and efficient use of resources, and (7) religious requirement. Generally, more than one of these categories applies to any marriage. However, I imagine there are plenty of marriages without any one of the identified purposes. Now, whether restricting marriage to male-female couples appears to be sex or sexual-orientation discrimination, or both, depends on which purpose you are mainly concerned with. Lets have a chart:
Its probably not so clear what I'm getting at here. It is this: with respect to each stated purpose of marriage, it may matter if the couple is same sex or not. If marriage was simply raising kids or a very close platonic commitment between two people, a person's sexual orientation would not necessarily have a bearing on who someone would choose to marry. Thus, for many of what we consider to be the most important aspects of marriage, its not about sexual attraction, but about something else. Of course, there is an assumption of sexual attraction and generally people have such desire, making a purely platonic marriage unlikely (except in the case where a couple that once had such attraction looses it, and the other purposes remain). If the purpose of marriage is to meet a religious obligation, limiting marriage would constitute discrimination against those whose religion allows for same sex marriage.
There was a good deal of discussion of whether limiting marriage to male-female couples is discrimination based on sex or discrimination based on sexual-orientation, and if the latter, should rational-basis or a heightened level of scrutiny be applied. The court of appeal below decided that the law is not sex discrimination and rational basis review applies. I have previously argued that the restriction is facially discriminatory based on sex (not just sexual orientation), and the court of appeal was able to overlook this fact because of the reflexive nature of the limit
The court of appeal adopted the argument that all people have the same limitation: they cannot marry a person of the opposite sex; therefore, no sex discrimination. However, a more careful analysis is reveals two different rules: (1) men may not marry men; and (2) women may not marry women. Each of these rules is specific to gender and each is sex discrimination. Only men are prevented from marring men, and only women are prevented from marrying women. Clearly men and women are being treated differently, despite the reciprocal nature of the discrimination. It is often argued that limiting marriage only affects individuals who are homosexual. Therefore, it is only sexual-orientation discrimination. This argument is not entirely convincing. Consider a pair of laws that disallows men from working as teachers and women from working as reporters. Clearly the law discriminates on the basis of sex, even though only a narrow portion of the male and female population desire to be teachers and reports, respectively. The laws really only affect sub-categories of "didactically-orientated males" and "inquisitive-orientated females." Similarly marriage limiting laws create two rules, one imposed on all men and one on all women that have their most significant affects on sub-populations of those who desire to be with people of the opposite sex. In either case, the discrimination is still based upon sex.
Here is another idea. Perhaps much of the confusion over the marriage question comes from the many different asserted justifications for the legal status. I identify the following purposes: (1) raising children (through providing a sense of unity, commitment for long term obligations, tax breaks, shared income and responsibilities, etc.), (2) romantic companionship, (3) platonic companionship, (5) mutual support obligations, (6) unification of family assets and efficient use of resources, and (7) religious requirement. Generally, more than one of these categories applies to any marriage. However, I imagine there are plenty of marriages without any one of the identified purposes. Now, whether restricting marriage to male-female couples appears to be sex or sexual-orientation discrimination, or both, depends on which purpose you are mainly concerned with. Lets have a chart:
Reason for Marriage | Sex Discrimination? | Sex-Orientation Discrimination? | Other Discrimination? |
Children | Yes | No | |
Romance | No | Yes | |
Platonic | Yes | No | |
Mutual Support | Yes | No | |
Assets | Yes | No | |
Religion | No | No | Yes, Religious |
Its probably not so clear what I'm getting at here. It is this: with respect to each stated purpose of marriage, it may matter if the couple is same sex or not. If marriage was simply raising kids or a very close platonic commitment between two people, a person's sexual orientation would not necessarily have a bearing on who someone would choose to marry. Thus, for many of what we consider to be the most important aspects of marriage, its not about sexual attraction, but about something else. Of course, there is an assumption of sexual attraction and generally people have such desire, making a purely platonic marriage unlikely (except in the case where a couple that once had such attraction looses it, and the other purposes remain). If the purpose of marriage is to meet a religious obligation, limiting marriage would constitute discrimination against those whose religion allows for same sex marriage.
Saturday, March 01, 2008
Intent and Experimental Philosophy
Two stories:
Did the chairman intend to hurt the environment?
Did the chairman intend to hurt the environment?
A common answer to given to question one is yes; to question two, no. Even though in both situations the chariman had knowledge of a result (i.e., harm or benefit to the environment), but not purpose to cause the event (i.e., his purpose was purely an interest in money). So why the different answers?
I have three thoughts:
(1) In the first story we are comparing costs and benefits (money v. environment), and in the second, there are only benefits (money + environment). In the first situation, depending upon a person's values, they will or will not make the product. In the second, everyone would make the product because there is no downside. This distinction suggests that people's definition of intent depends upon whether a choice needs to be made. In the second story, there is really no choice at all.
(2) Most people can readily think of something that harms the environment, while often "environmentally friendly" products are really something that tends to cause less harm, rather than reducing harm in an absolute sense. For example, driving a hybrid does not remove carbon dioxide from the air, but merely introduces less carbon dioxide. So, when someone thinks about these two stories, they are likely to have a background understanding that the employee in the second story is not actually saying the product will help the environment (for example, a product that removes pollution from the air), but merely cause less of an effect or no effect on the environment.* This background knowledge may influence what they consider intentional. In the first situation there appears to be a change from the status quo to a more polluted environment, in the second, it could be the case that the product merely maintains the status quo instead of making the environment more polluted. If this is the basis for the distinction, it suggests a distinction between action and inaction in determining what is "intentional."
(3) These two ideas different from the initial thoughts of the experimenter, Joshua Knobe, raises concerns that using this type of "experimental philosophy" is not that useful because it is difficult or impossible to (a) eliminate "background" facts in the questionee's mind (even if a question says "assume...," people will not necessary be able to completely eliminate their feelings regarding the probability of the stated assumption), or (b) determine what are the material differences between the two questions.
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and
said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase
profits, but it will also harm the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the
new program.’
Did the chairman intend to hurt the environment?
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and
said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase
profits, and it will also help the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the
new program.’
Did the chairman intend to hurt the environment?
A common answer to given to question one is yes; to question two, no. Even though in both situations the chariman had knowledge of a result (i.e., harm or benefit to the environment), but not purpose to cause the event (i.e., his purpose was purely an interest in money). So why the different answers?
I have three thoughts:
(1) In the first story we are comparing costs and benefits (money v. environment), and in the second, there are only benefits (money + environment). In the first situation, depending upon a person's values, they will or will not make the product. In the second, everyone would make the product because there is no downside. This distinction suggests that people's definition of intent depends upon whether a choice needs to be made. In the second story, there is really no choice at all.
(2) Most people can readily think of something that harms the environment, while often "environmentally friendly" products are really something that tends to cause less harm, rather than reducing harm in an absolute sense. For example, driving a hybrid does not remove carbon dioxide from the air, but merely introduces less carbon dioxide. So, when someone thinks about these two stories, they are likely to have a background understanding that the employee in the second story is not actually saying the product will help the environment (for example, a product that removes pollution from the air), but merely cause less of an effect or no effect on the environment.* This background knowledge may influence what they consider intentional. In the first situation there appears to be a change from the status quo to a more polluted environment, in the second, it could be the case that the product merely maintains the status quo instead of making the environment more polluted. If this is the basis for the distinction, it suggests a distinction between action and inaction in determining what is "intentional."
(3) These two ideas different from the initial thoughts of the experimenter, Joshua Knobe, raises concerns that using this type of "experimental philosophy" is not that useful because it is difficult or impossible to (a) eliminate "background" facts in the questionee's mind (even if a question says "assume...," people will not necessary be able to completely eliminate their feelings regarding the probability of the stated assumption), or (b) determine what are the material differences between the two questions.
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Executions
One of the most powerful arguments against capital punishment is that many individuals have been revealed to be innocent while waiting on death row. The risk of killing innocent people is too great.
Our laws establish a two step process of applying punishment: first the jury determines whether evidence of a wrongful act is demonstrated to a particular burden of proof; then, the punishment assigned for that wrongful act is applied. For civil disputes, the burden of proof is generally more likely than not; for criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. In death penalty cases, in general, the jury first determines guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; then, the jury determines whether the crimes and the offender are sufficiently despicable to warrant the penalty of death, taking into account a variety of factors.
Personally, I feel--assuming the death penalty is worthwhile in the first place--capital punishment should not be limited to the most despicable crimes; rather, death should be limited to those individuals who we are absolutely certain have committed the crimes they are accused of.
I suggest that, for death penalty cases, guilt should be determined by a beyond a reasonable doubt, but the punishment of death may be imposed only where there is "irrefutable evidence" of guilt. Such a standard would allow imposition of death penalties where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, eliminating the risk of killing an innocent person; it will satisfy the preference of many Americans to kill the worst offenders; it would allow judges to independently and dispassionately evaluate the evidence to ensure a possibly innocent person is put to death; it will also allow plea bargains to put the offender in prison for life without the need for a costly trial. Plea bargains are also useful in some instances to gain information from the offender regarding accomplices or information regarding the location of victims.
Such a standard also might reduce the impact of conscious or unconscious racism in the application of the death penalty.
Our laws establish a two step process of applying punishment: first the jury determines whether evidence of a wrongful act is demonstrated to a particular burden of proof; then, the punishment assigned for that wrongful act is applied. For civil disputes, the burden of proof is generally more likely than not; for criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. In death penalty cases, in general, the jury first determines guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; then, the jury determines whether the crimes and the offender are sufficiently despicable to warrant the penalty of death, taking into account a variety of factors.
Personally, I feel--assuming the death penalty is worthwhile in the first place--capital punishment should not be limited to the most despicable crimes; rather, death should be limited to those individuals who we are absolutely certain have committed the crimes they are accused of.
I suggest that, for death penalty cases, guilt should be determined by a beyond a reasonable doubt, but the punishment of death may be imposed only where there is "irrefutable evidence" of guilt. Such a standard would allow imposition of death penalties where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, eliminating the risk of killing an innocent person; it will satisfy the preference of many Americans to kill the worst offenders; it would allow judges to independently and dispassionately evaluate the evidence to ensure a possibly innocent person is put to death; it will also allow plea bargains to put the offender in prison for life without the need for a costly trial. Plea bargains are also useful in some instances to gain information from the offender regarding accomplices or information regarding the location of victims.
Such a standard also might reduce the impact of conscious or unconscious racism in the application of the death penalty.
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
"The tyranny of the market"
Joel Waldfogelexplains the idea behind his book: sometimes the market will not address the desires of minority groups. While this is true, most of the time there is not much society (through government) should do about it. Exceptions include things like mandates to accommodate the disabled. I have thought about the tyranny of the majority through individual market choices before, but I think the problem comes more with the creation of societal norms. For example, once enough people acquire a cell phone, or check their email daily, or do some other activity, others will be expected to do the same. These unwanted expectations can be aggravated through social status competition. How many young couples spends thousands or tens of thousands of dollars more on a wedding because of modern American cultural norms regarding what is acceptable?
Sunday, September 30, 2007
Friday, September 07, 2007
Keep on whining
Tyler Cowen is upset at people who purchased iphones that are now complaining about the announced price cut: "It is you people, you who resent Coase (1972), you people who induce wage and price stickiness and widen the Okun gap. . . . AAARRRGGGHH!"
I understand how Tyler feels in some ways. Why should a person complain simply because another person gets a better deal. It should have no effect on whether the deal you received was good. However, there are at least three answers to this:
First, people are not just concerned about whether they have purchased an item that is worth more to them then the amount of money they have paid, they are interested in getting an item at the best price possible (or a "fair" price). Lets say the iPhone was worth $1000 to a particular customer, she has a consumer surplus of $400 when she purchases the phone of $600. That is a good deal, but if the consume was able to buy it for $400, they would have $200 to purchase other items, increasing their utility to at least $1200.
Second, Apple sells a product, but they also sell an (exclusive) culture. By increasing the number of people who can buy, they reduce that exclusivity. When a person purchased the phone for $600, they expected the price and the level of exclusivity to remain that high for a period of time (at least a year, let's say). When Apple reduces the price, it just reduced the value after the purchase was already made.
Third, Apple breached a custom that has value: selling a product at the same price to each consumer. It might be efficient for many companies to sell products at different prices to different consumers in order to extract the maximum revenue. And this could benefit most people by encouraging the production of valuable products, increasing the number of people who will want to purchase an item, and lower prices for many consumers. However, variable prices come with their own costs. When people know prices might change it adds an incentive to try to get the lowest price possible. This could encourage people to delay purchases, to invest time into investigating price changes, and generally increase transaction cost. Ever know someone who spent every day checking flight information looking for price drops? Ever tried to find out the real price of a car? Getting a good deal can be a pain in the ass. Having a norm of giving everyone the same price reduces these transaction costs.
I understand how Tyler feels in some ways. Why should a person complain simply because another person gets a better deal. It should have no effect on whether the deal you received was good. However, there are at least three answers to this:
First, people are not just concerned about whether they have purchased an item that is worth more to them then the amount of money they have paid, they are interested in getting an item at the best price possible (or a "fair" price). Lets say the iPhone was worth $1000 to a particular customer, she has a consumer surplus of $400 when she purchases the phone of $600. That is a good deal, but if the consume was able to buy it for $400, they would have $200 to purchase other items, increasing their utility to at least $1200.
Second, Apple sells a product, but they also sell an (exclusive) culture. By increasing the number of people who can buy, they reduce that exclusivity. When a person purchased the phone for $600, they expected the price and the level of exclusivity to remain that high for a period of time (at least a year, let's say). When Apple reduces the price, it just reduced the value after the purchase was already made.
Third, Apple breached a custom that has value: selling a product at the same price to each consumer. It might be efficient for many companies to sell products at different prices to different consumers in order to extract the maximum revenue. And this could benefit most people by encouraging the production of valuable products, increasing the number of people who will want to purchase an item, and lower prices for many consumers. However, variable prices come with their own costs. When people know prices might change it adds an incentive to try to get the lowest price possible. This could encourage people to delay purchases, to invest time into investigating price changes, and generally increase transaction cost. Ever know someone who spent every day checking flight information looking for price drops? Ever tried to find out the real price of a car? Getting a good deal can be a pain in the ass. Having a norm of giving everyone the same price reduces these transaction costs.
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
Law Breakers!
Cristina Rodriguez makes some points I mostly agree with.
The vast majority of Americans recognize that the 12 million undocumented immigrants cannot simply be found and shipped out, both for the sake of the American economy and because it is unfair to many that have worked and raised family in America.
Imagine if we could know everyone that drove above the speed limit in the last ten years and then decided to give them tickets. It would be an absurd result with the majority of Americans owing hundreds of thousands of dollars; their license revokes many times over. It is simply unfair to set up a particular enforcement scheme (or lack of enforcement scheme) and then attempt to harshly punish those who acted in response to that system.
It appears that the current system is a dysfunctional stalemate between business interest that want more immigrant workers and pro-immigrant groups and the know-nothing nativists. The easiest thing for a politician to do is keep official immigration low, by restricting official immigration, but keep unofficial immigration high. Similarly, politicians can get behind a big wall. Like low visa numbers, it looks like an effort to reduce immigration, but it is unlikely to significantly limit the number of undocumented workers.
I would propose a massive increase in the number of legal immigrants along with punishment largely directed at employers who hire illegal immigrants or do not comply with labor laws.
The vast majority of Americans recognize that the 12 million undocumented immigrants cannot simply be found and shipped out, both for the sake of the American economy and because it is unfair to many that have worked and raised family in America.
Imagine if we could know everyone that drove above the speed limit in the last ten years and then decided to give them tickets. It would be an absurd result with the majority of Americans owing hundreds of thousands of dollars; their license revokes many times over. It is simply unfair to set up a particular enforcement scheme (or lack of enforcement scheme) and then attempt to harshly punish those who acted in response to that system.
It appears that the current system is a dysfunctional stalemate between business interest that want more immigrant workers and pro-immigrant groups and the know-nothing nativists. The easiest thing for a politician to do is keep official immigration low, by restricting official immigration, but keep unofficial immigration high. Similarly, politicians can get behind a big wall. Like low visa numbers, it looks like an effort to reduce immigration, but it is unlikely to significantly limit the number of undocumented workers.
I would propose a massive increase in the number of legal immigrants along with punishment largely directed at employers who hire illegal immigrants or do not comply with labor laws.
Thursday, June 21, 2007
Redistribution
Marginal Revolution:
The first sentence of the comment compares inequalities in "looks, friends, or sex life" with inequalities in distribution in wealth. You might notice that each of these categories is extremely personal. How our economy functions and distributes wealth is extremely not personal: do you know who made any of the possessions in your room? Even if you're crafty, you got the materials from somewhere. The "market" is an amazing wealth creating tool. Well-functioning markets are created by governments and civil society: the individuals who create and obey the laws of property, contract, and tort. Tiny amounts of wealth creation can be attributed to individual efforts, while cooperative civil society makes a modern industrial society possible. Most of the massive income some individuals earn can be attributed to a well-functioning civil society or the accrued technological knowledge of generations bygone. Bill Gates's nerd-power would not get him much on a desert island. (Perhaps he has realized this and started to share his wealth.) Accordingly, it is appropriate to distribute some of the gains to everyone in the society who had created them. Even the poor.
Looks? Society as a whole does not help create good looks. Friends and a sex life are not something that can be redistributed. Even with these seemingly insurmountable barriers, "we" still try to help. Our government gives everyone an education, giving them tools to overcome deficits in looks and social connections. Institutions often judge people by tests without viewing an individual, avoiding the influence of social networks and smooth skin. Non-corrupt government bureaucracy itself is a large normalizing force.
The second sentence notes we do not take kidneys involuntarily. Again, society/government does not create kidneys.
One of the most important values Americans hold is equality of opportunity. The quote suggests that in the absence of redistribution, a meritocracy would exist. This assumes an equality of opportunity that does not exist. Children need well-off educated parents in order to perform to their potential.
Perhaps Tyler (the author) accepts a system that does not provide for equality of opportunity or provide wealth equal to contribution. All that is important is future aggregate wealth. Or, in other words, "We all had a shot at the wealth lottery. It just so happened that my family and I won. If you lost, too bad. And please stop trying to take money from me."
We don't take steps to redress inequalities of looks, friends, or sex life. We don't grab a kidney from you to save someone's life, even though that health difference was unfair brute luck. Redistribution of wealth has some role in maintaining a stable democracy and preventing starvation. But the power of wealth redistribution to produce net value is quite limited. The power of wealth creation to produce net value is extraordinary. Most of America's poor are already among the best-off of all humans in world history. We should be putting our resources, including our advocacy and our intellectual resources, into wealth creation as much as we can.
The first sentence of the comment compares inequalities in "looks, friends, or sex life" with inequalities in distribution in wealth. You might notice that each of these categories is extremely personal. How our economy functions and distributes wealth is extremely not personal: do you know who made any of the possessions in your room? Even if you're crafty, you got the materials from somewhere. The "market" is an amazing wealth creating tool. Well-functioning markets are created by governments and civil society: the individuals who create and obey the laws of property, contract, and tort. Tiny amounts of wealth creation can be attributed to individual efforts, while cooperative civil society makes a modern industrial society possible. Most of the massive income some individuals earn can be attributed to a well-functioning civil society or the accrued technological knowledge of generations bygone. Bill Gates's nerd-power would not get him much on a desert island. (Perhaps he has realized this and started to share his wealth.) Accordingly, it is appropriate to distribute some of the gains to everyone in the society who had created them. Even the poor.
Looks? Society as a whole does not help create good looks. Friends and a sex life are not something that can be redistributed. Even with these seemingly insurmountable barriers, "we" still try to help. Our government gives everyone an education, giving them tools to overcome deficits in looks and social connections. Institutions often judge people by tests without viewing an individual, avoiding the influence of social networks and smooth skin. Non-corrupt government bureaucracy itself is a large normalizing force.
The second sentence notes we do not take kidneys involuntarily. Again, society/government does not create kidneys.
One of the most important values Americans hold is equality of opportunity. The quote suggests that in the absence of redistribution, a meritocracy would exist. This assumes an equality of opportunity that does not exist. Children need well-off educated parents in order to perform to their potential.
Perhaps Tyler (the author) accepts a system that does not provide for equality of opportunity or provide wealth equal to contribution. All that is important is future aggregate wealth. Or, in other words, "We all had a shot at the wealth lottery. It just so happened that my family and I won. If you lost, too bad. And please stop trying to take money from me."
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
First Congressperson to Amit They Do Not Believe in God
Rep. Stark
Generally, such an admission would be politically foolish, but he as been a Congressperson for more than 30 years. So, either he is feeling confident, or doesn't mind going into retirement.
Generally, such an admission would be politically foolish, but he as been a Congressperson for more than 30 years. So, either he is feeling confident, or doesn't mind going into retirement.
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